The influence of local officials' promotion incentives on carbon emission in Yangtze River Delta, China by Meng, Hao et al.
The influence of local officials' promotion 
incentives on carbon emission in Yangtze 
River Delta, China 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Creative Commons: Attribution­Noncommercial­No Derivative Works 4.0 
Meng, H., Huang, X., Yang, H., Chen, Z., Yang, J., Zhou, Y. 
and Li, J. (2019) The influence of local officials' promotion 
incentives on carbon emission in Yangtze River Delta, China. 
Journal of Cleaner Production, 213. pp. 1337­1345. ISSN 
0959­6526 doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.12.036 
Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/81861/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
Published version at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0959652618337387 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.12.036 
Publisher: Elsevier 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
1 
The influence of local officials’ promotion incentives on carbon 
emission in Yangtze River Delta, China 
 
Hao Meng
a
, Xianjin Huang
 a,b*
, Hong Yang
 a,c**
, Zhigang Chen
a
, Jun Yang
a
, Yan Zhou
a
, 
Jianbao Li
a 
 
a School of Geography and Ocean Science, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210023, China 
b The Key Laboratory of the Coastal Zone Exploitation and Protection, Ministry of Land and 
Resources, Nanjing 210023, China 
c Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Reading, Reading RG6 
6AB, UK 
 
* Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: menghao09@163.com (H. Meng), hxj369@nju.edu.cn (X. Huang), 
hongyanghy@gmail.com (H. Yang), zgchen@nju.edu.cn (Z. Chen), jycug_edu@163.com (J. 
Yang), zhy555ylp@163.com (Y. Zhou), lijianbao888@126.com (J. Li). 
 
Addresses: School of Geography and Oceanography Sciences, Nanjing University, 163 Xianlin 
Street, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China. 
 
Highlights: 
 A theoretical framework was constructed to analyse the influence of promotion 
incentives on carbon emissions. 
 Local officials’ promotion sources, tenure and age signiﬁcantly influenced total 
carbon emission. 
 Local officials with a professional background in economics and management 
has a significant influence on carbon reduction.  
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Abstract: China’s carbon emissions is heavily influenced by economic growth, 
which can be largely related to the local officials’ promotion incentives. The current 
study was conducted to test the hypothesis that the influence of local ofﬁcials’ 
individual characteristics on carbon emissions was driven by the promotion incentives. 
Yangtze River Delta where carbon emissions accounted for around 13.95% of China’s 
total emissions was selected as the research area. The multiple linear regression model 
was applied to determine the relationship between local ofﬁcials’ characteristics and 
total carbon emissions and carbon emissions from different sectors. The results 
indicated that local officials’ promotion source, tenure and age signiﬁcantly influenced 
the total carbon emission. Despite insignificance influence of officials’ academic level 
on carbon emissions, the professional background in economics and management had a 
significant influence on carbon reduction. Our results indicated the importance of local 
officials’ promotion incentives for carbon emission in China. Therefore, low carbon 
development should be included as an important part of official promotion system. 
Keywords: Carbon Emissions; Local Officials; Promotion Incentives; Yangtze 
River Delta; China 
Graphical abstract: 
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1 Introduction 
Human activities have accelerated the increase in greenhouse gases (GHGs) in 
atmosphere, which exacerbate global warming (Anagnostou et al., 2016; Friedlingstein 
et al., 2014; MacDougall and Friedlingstein, 2015). In 2016, CO2 concentration 
reached at 403.3±0.1 ppm, CH4 reached at 1853±2 ppb and N2O reached at 328.9±0.1 
ppb, increasing by 45%, 157% and 22% than pre-industrial level (before 1750) (Yang et 
al., 2013). Particularly, China surpassed the US and became global largest CO2 emitter 
in 2005 (Janssens-Maenhout et al., 2017). With sustained economic growth and rapid 
urbanization and industrialization, China's total carbon emissions may continue to 
increase in the next years. In the Paris climate conference, China announced that the 
country will achieve the peak of CO2 emission by around 2030, with best efforts to peak 
early (Liu et al., 2014). On June 1, 2017, the US declared its withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement, which will very likely impact carbon emission from the US. Nevertheless, 
China still plan to launch the national carbon emissions trading market. Therefore, 
China's action on carbon emission receives increasing global attention (Gibney, 2016). 
In spite of many studies, the driving mechanism of China’s carbon emission is still 
not well known. The driving factors include appearance factors and fundamental 
factors(Geist and Lambin, 2002). In general, appearance factors include economy, 
population, energy and technology (Ang and Su, 2016; Ye et al., 2017). The traditional 
theories, such as the environmental Kuznets down "U" curve, carbon emissions 
decoupling, pollution shelter and other theories, come from the economic point of view 
to explain the mechanism of carbon emissions. The fundamental factors, including laws 
and regulations, national and government policies, land use, and human behaviour (Lai 
et al., 2016), are more responsive to an in-depth explanation of the driving mechanisms. 
According to North’s theory of institutional change (Besley et al., 2012), material 
and human capital growth and technological progress are only the result of economic 
growth, rather than the inherent source of growth, and are the root determinants of 
institutional arrangements. In west governments, the political reputation model 
explains the impact of political incentives on regional development. To seek re-election, 
politicians revise policies on taxation, environment and education according to voters’ 
preferences (Ales et al., 2014). Different from their counterparts, Chinese local officials 
are more likely to be held to “higher authorities' appointment” rather than voter election. 
The most influential theories of China's economic growth miracle are “Federalism, 
Chinese Style” (Jin et al., 2005) and “Promotion Tournament Model Theory” (Pu and 
Fu, 2018), which states that the incentives of local officials are an important engine of 
China's economic development. Many studies have found that the main reason for 
China's increasing CO2 emission is the extensive economic growth (Liu and Diamond, 
2005; Zhang et al., 2013). And therefore there may be some relationships between the 
incentives of official promotion and carbon emission in China. Understanding the 
influence of local officials on carbon emissions is very important for global climate 
action, especially for China, the largest CO2 emitter. However, previous researches 
largely overlooked the role of government officials in carbon emission. 
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Officials are different actors. They act also according to their own political 
demands to make the appropriate promotion response. The most extreme example is 
the recent change of the American president and the following climate policy to further 
support fossil energy. To the best of our knowledge, there is no available study on the 
influence of local official on carbon emissions in China. To meet the knowledge gap, 
the relationship between carbon emissions and characteristics of local ofﬁcials 
motivated by the promotion incentives were analysed. Totally 25 cities in the Yangtze 
River Delta (YRD), one of the areas with most rapid increase in carbon emissions in 
China (Li et al., 2017), were researched during the period of 2000-2010. The results 
reveal the underlying drivers of carbon emission and provide a new perspective of 
China's carbon reduction. 
2 Material and methods 
Based on a theoretical framework, multiple linear regression models were 
constructed to calculate the relationship between local ofﬁcials’ characteristics and 
carbon emissions, including total carbon emission and carbon emissions from the four 
sectors including Energy, IPPU (industrial processes and product use), AFOLU 
(agriculture, forestry and other land use), and Waste. 
2.1 Multiple linear regression model 
2.1.1 Variable selection 
In China, the carbon emissions are mainly driven by GDP, GDP per capita (PGDP), 
population (POP), fixed asset investments (INV) and industrial structure (second 
industry accounted for GDP, IS) (Peters et al., 2017). Therefore, the above factors were 
selected as control variables. 
Constitution of the Communist Party of China requires the contingent of cadres has 
four principles including "revolutionization", "young", "knowledge" and 
"specialization". It also stipulates that each tenure of local official is five years and 
officials must retire at the age of 60 years old (Burns and Wang, 2010). Due to the 
measure difficulty of "revolutionary", age, tenure and education have become more 
important factors in local officials’ promotion. Educational background of local 
officials can be measured by both profession and academic level (Dreher et al., 2009). 
The promotion source was the key variable influencing local officials’ promotion 
experience (Chen et al., 2017; Dreher et al., 2009). As the saying goes, “a new broom 
sweeps clean”. Compared with officials promoted from their home cities, those 
transferred from other cities usually developed strategies to showcase their unique 
ideas and highlight their future performance. However, due to the lack of sufficient 
awareness of the local information, the new policies may not be in line with local 
situation, and the environmental costs brought about by these policies can be very high 
(Duan and Hu, 2014). Therefore, promotion source was chosen to represent the 
promotion experience of local officials. 
Multicollinearity verification was conducted for all variables using the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) in Stata13.0. The maximum VIF is 9.46, less than 10. Due to the 
significant collinearity between GDP with other variables, GDP was excluded, but 
5 
PGDP, POP, INV and IS were included as the control variables (Krebs et al., 2012). 
Based on the above analysis, a theoretical framework was constructed to analyse the 
influence of local officials’ promotion incentives on carbon emission in three ways: 
promotion experience, pressure during current tenure and motivation for future 
promotion. 
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Fig. 1. The analytical framework of local official’s promotion incentives and carbon emissions. 
Notes: GDP represents gross domestic product; IPPU represents carbon emission from industrial 
processes and product use sector; and AFOLU represents carbon emissions from agriculture, forestry and 
other land use sector. 
2.1.2 Model establishment 
The panel data of 25 cities in the YRD from 2000 to 2010 were applied to examine 
the specific impact of the promotion of local officials on the carbon emissions by 
estimating the following econometric model (Sun et al., 2017): 
𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑟 = 𝐶 + 𝛼𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑘𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑘 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                          (1) 
where 𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑟  represents the carbon emissions in city i during the period t, the total carbon 
emissions and carbon emissions from Energy, IPPU, AFOLU, and Waste. C represents 
a constant term, and 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 represents control variables. 𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑘  represents local officials’ 
individual characteristics; 𝜇𝑖𝑡  denotes the error term; and 𝛼𝑗  and 𝛽𝑘  are the 
regression coefficients of variable groups 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑗
 and 𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑘 . According to the previous 
theoretical framework, the above model was developed by selecting five aspects to 
measure the heterogeneity of local officials including the mayor and the municipal 
party secretary using Equations (2) and (3): 
𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑟 = 𝐶 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑝𝑟𝑜_𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽3𝑀𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                          (2) 
𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑟′
= 𝐶 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑜_𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 
+𝛽3𝑃𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                           (3) 
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where 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the promotion sources of city i in period t (0 = promote from 
local city, 1 = promote from another city). 𝑝𝑟𝑜_𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡  denotes that the local 
officials of i in period t have a professional background in economics and management 
(0 = no economic and management professional background, 1 = have such 
professional background). 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 denotes the current tenure of the local officials in 
city i in period t. 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 denotes the age of local officials of city i in period t (unit: year). 
𝑎𝑐𝑎_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 denotes the academic level of local officials (1 = Associate degree, 2 = 
Bachelor degree, 3 = Master degree and 4 = Doctoral degree).  
Based on all data from 25 cities during the period of 2000-2010, software STATA 
Version 13 (Stata Corp, College Station, Texas, USA) was used to conduct the above 
models. Panel data generally had a difference between the fixed effect (FE) model, 
random effect (RE) model or ordinary least square (OLS) model (Xu et al., 2015). An 
F test with Clustering Robust Standard Errors suggested that the FE-model was better 
than the OLS-model. The further analysis using the Hausman test indicated p value 
greater than 0.05 (Yang et al., 2017), so the RE-model was considered as the most 
effective model. 
2.2 Research area and data source 
The YRD is located in the eastern coast of mainland China, including Shanghai 
direct-controlled municipality, Jiangsu Province and Zhejiang Province and 25 
prefecture-level cities (Fig. 2). The YRD accounted for 2.19% of China's land area, 
11.59% of China's population and 20.02% of China's GDP in 2015 (National Bureau 
Statistics of China, 2016). The YRD has developed into one of China’s economic 
centres, as well as the world’s sixth largest urban agglomeration (Li et al., 2018). 
However, the YRD consumed 13.69% of China's energy and emited 13.95% of 
China's s total carbon emissions in 2015, equivalent to Japan's carbon emissions 
(Janssens-Maenhout et al., 2017). Environmental pollution has been a big challenge in 
the region, especially with frequent hazes. In 2015, the annual days with safe air quality 
decreased to less than 250 days. YRD has been a microcosm of whole China’s carbon 
emission and air pollution. The research in YRD will be helpful to understand carbon 
emission in other regions in China, and it may also provide experience for cities in other 
countries. 
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Fig. 2. Research area in the Yangtze River Delta, China 
Local officials’ individual characteristics were obtained from several databases. The 
tenure and name of the mayor and municipal party committee of the city were 
obtained from Zecheng Net (http://www.hotelaah.com/liren/index.html). Based on the 
name of the official, all local official's yearly resumes were searched in Baidu 
(www.baidu.com), and the resumes include the promotion source, professional 
background, tenure, age and academic level. It is worth noting that some local 
officials were not appointed at the same time. If the appointment date was before June, 
officials’ tenure was counted from that year. Otherwise, it was calculated from next 
year. GDP per capita (PGDP), population (POP) and investment in fixed assets and 
secondary industry values (INV) were obtained from the annual Shanghai Statistical 
Yearbook, Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook and Zhejiang Statistical Yearbook for the 
period of 2001-2011. 
High-precision spatial grid (0.1° x 0.1°) carbon emissions data obtained from the 
Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR), a widely used 
database for carbon emissions and air pollution research (Janssens-Maenhout et al., 
2017; Peters et al., 2017), were used to calculate the carbon emissions from 25 cities in 
the YRD. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables. It is noteworthy that 
the education levels of some local officials are missing, and the panel data are 
unbalanced. 
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Table 1 
Data description. 
 
Variable Unit Observations Mean 
Std. 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
EC 
Total TgC 275 8.56 9.87 0.01 62.77 
Energy TgC 275 6.31 8.08 0.01 51.3 
IPPU TgC 275 1.11 1.36 0 9.53 
AFOLU TgC 275 0.74 0.83 0 4.66 
Waste TgC 275 0.38 0.34 0 1.42 
PGDP 
 
106 
CHY/person 
275 277.58 188.76 39.71 952.28 
POP 
 
106 person 275 5.18 2.71 1.05 15.31 
INV 
 
109 CHY 275 84.20 85.37 4.22 463.05 
IS 
 
% 275 51.83 6.36 29.6 66.6 
Source 
Msource / 275 0.73 0.45 0 1 
Psource / 275 0.48 0.5 0 1 
Professional 
background 
Mpro_economic / 263 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Ppro_economic / 263 0.46 0.5 0 1 
Tenure 
Mtenure year 275 2.82 1.81 1 9 
Ptenure year 275 3.16 1.93 1 10 
Age 
Mage year 275 49.58 4.65 39 70 
Page year 275 51.85 4.51 43 73 
Academic 
level 
Maca_level / 269 1.84 0.77 0 3 
Paca_level / 265 1.82 0.67 0 3 
Notes: EC refers to carbon emission. PGDP refers to GDP per capita. POP refers population. INV refers to 
fixed asset investment. IS refers to industrial structure. M refers to the mayor. P refers to the municipal party 
committee. 
2.3 Calculation of carbon emissions 
EDGAR provides data that contain not only the total CO2, CH4 and NO2 but also 
emissions data for different sectors. However, the sectors were classified in accordance 
with the IPCC1996 code. According to “2006 IPCC Guidelines for National 
Greenhouse Gas Inventories”, sectors were reclassified to Energy, IPPU, AFOLU, and 
Waste using ArcGIS 10.2 (ESRI Inc, Redlands, California, USA) (Table 2). 
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Table 2 
Carbon emissions from difference sectors. 
Categories CO2 CH4 N2O 
Energy 
Energy industry; 
Energy manufacturing 
transformation; 
Energy manufacturing 
transformation; 
Transformation 
non-energy use; 
Non-road transportation; Non-road transportation; 
Combustion in 
manufacturing industry; 
Road transportation; Road transportation; 
International and domestic 
aviation; 
Energy for buildings; Energy for buildings; 
Road transportation; Fugitive from solid; Oil production and refineries; 
Non-road ground 
transport; 
Oil production and 
refineries;  
International and domestic 
shipping; 
Gas production and 
distribution;  
Energy for buildings; 
  
Fugitive from solid; 
  
Oil production and 
refineries;   
IPPU 
Non-metallic mineral 
processes; 
Industrial process and 
product use; 
Industrial process and product 
use; 
Chemical processes 
solvents;   
Metal processes; 
  
AFOLU 
Agricultural soils; Enteric fermentation; Manure management; 
Large Scale Biomass 
Burning; 
Manure management; Agricultural soils; 
 
Agricultural soils; 
Indirect N2O emissions from 
agriculture; 
 
Agricultural waste burning; Agricultural waste burning; 
Waste 
Solid waste disposal; Solid waste disposal; Waste solid and wastewater; 
Fossil Fuel Fires; Waste water; Fossil Fuel Fires; 
 
Fossil Fuel Fires; 
Indirect emissions from NOx 
and NH3. 
Notes: IPPU refers to industrial processes and product use sector. AFOLU refers to agriculture, forestry and 
other land use sector. 
Regarding the greenhouse gases, the warming effects of CO2, CH4 and N2O were 
76%, 16% and 6.2%, respectively (Pachauri et al., 2014). To estimate the total warming 
effect, different greenhouse gases were converted to CO2-equivalent emissions and 
then converted into the amount of carbon emissions as follows: 
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𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 = (𝐸𝐶𝑂2 + 𝐺𝑊𝑃𝐶𝐻4 ∗ 𝐸𝐶𝐻4 + 𝐺𝑊𝑃𝑁2𝑂 ∗ 𝐸𝑁2𝑂) ∗ 𝑀𝑟𝐶/𝑀𝑟𝐶𝑂2       (4) 
where the Global Warming Potential (GWP) represents the warming capacity of 
greenhouse gases relative to the carbon dioxide (CO2). 𝐺𝑊𝑃𝐶𝐻4 and 𝐺𝑊𝑃𝑁2𝑂 adopt 
the 100-year GWP (GWP100) standard value in “the Climate change 2014: synthesis 
report”, which are 28 and 265, respectively (Pachauri et al., 2014). 𝐸𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛, 𝐸𝐶𝑂2, 
𝐸𝐶𝐻4 and 𝐸𝑁2𝑂 represent the emissions of carbon, CO2, CH4 and N2O, respectively. 
𝑀𝑟𝐶 and 𝑀𝑟𝐶𝑂2 are the relative molecular mass of C and CO2, 𝑀𝑟𝐶 = 12, and 𝑀𝑟𝐶 
= 44. 
3 Results 
3.1 Spatiotemporal pattern of carbon emission 
Carbon emissions rapidly increased from 135.62 TgC yr
−1
 to 308.87 TgC yr
 −1
 from 
2000 to 2010, with an average annual growth rate of 7.77% (Fig. 3). The growth rate 
showed an inverted U-shaped curve, from 2.32% in 2001 to 15.25% in 2004, and then 
fell to 5.25% in 2010. From the emission structure, in 2010, the YRD exhausted 502.31 
TgCO2eq yr
−1
. CO2 accounted for 90.4%. CH4 and N2O contributed only 7.3% and 
2.3%, respectively. In terms of the emission sectors, the Energy sector accounted for 
the highest proportion of carbon emissions, from 68.78% in 2000 to 75.69% in 2010. 
IPPU sector contributed 12.35% - 13.96% of total carbon emissions between 2000 and 
2010, with average growth rate of 8.98%. AFOLU and Waste contributed 6.87% and 
3.48% of total carbon emissions, respectively; and the average annual growth rates 
were 1.97% and 2.20%, respectively. 
 
Fig. 3 Carbon emissions in Yangtze River Delta from 2000 to 2010 
The total carbon emissions in the YRD experienced a rapid growth process but with 
markedly spatial differences (Fig. 4). In 2000, Shanghai had the largest carbon 
emissions, followed by Xuzhou and Yancheng, while Zhoushan had the smallest one. In 
2005, the carbon emissions from Shanghai, Taizhou, Suzhou, Ningbo, Wenzhou and 
0
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other cities increased markedly. In 2010, the total carbon emissions in all cities further 
increased. The higher carbon emissions were concentrated mainly in Shanghai City, 
North Jiangsu Province and the coastal area in Zhejiang Province, while the lower 
carbon emissions appeared mainly in the southwest of Zhejiang Province. The highest 
value of 62.77 TgC in Shanghai was more than 2380 times greater than the lowest value 
of 0.03 TgC in Zhoushan. 
 
Fig. 4 Spatial pattern of carbon emissions in the Yangtze River Delta from 2000 to 2010 
3.2 Total carbon emissions 
Models (1) and (2) indicated that the coefficients of the control variables (INV, POP 
and IS) played prominent roles in carbon emissions. The effects of INV and IS were  
significantly positive at the 1% level,  suggesting that economic, fixed asset 
investments and secondary production significantly affect carbon emissions. The 
estimated coefficient of the variable POP is also positive, but not as significant as the 
other variables, and significant at the 5% level, indicating that the impact of the 
population on carbon emissions may be limited. However, PGDP is significantly 
negative at the 1% level, indicating that PGDP growth can reduce carbon emissions. 
According to the theory of Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), the carbon 
emissions in the YRD region exceeded the critical point of the EKC; with the further 
increase in income per capita, carbon emissions will gradually decrease (Jalil and 
Mahmud, 2009; Stern and Common, 2001). 
There are some significant correlations between carbon emissions and local 
officials' promotion experience, pressure during current tenure and motivation of 
future promotion (Table 3). 
3.2.1 Local officials' promotion experience 
Local officials’ promotion experience was mainly reflected in the promotion source 
and professional background. From the promotion source of local officials (Table 2), 
the average of Msource was 0.73, and the average of Psource was 0.48, indicating that 
73% mayors and 48% municipal party secretaries were promoted from other cities. 
The estimated coefficients for Msource and Psource were both significantly positive 
at the levels of 5%, respectively. Therefore, the promotion source of local officials had 
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a certain impact on carbon emission. The mayors and municipal party secretaries who 
were transferred from other cities were more likely to cause an increase in carbon 
emissions than locally promoted officials. 
The estimated coefficients of Mpro_economic and Ppro_economic were negative, 
but only Ppro_economic passed the 10% significance level test, indicating that 
municipal party secretaries with a professional background in economics or 
management were conducive to carbon reduction. 
3.2.2 Local officials' promotion pressure 
Fig. 5 shows that the YRD’s local officials had a shorter tenure. The average tenure 
of mayors and municipal party secretaries were 3 years and 4 years, respectively, 
much shorter than the statutory five-year tenure. This phenomenon was more obvious 
for the mayors than the municipal party secretaries. The regression coefficients of 
Ptenure was significant at the 1% level, and the mayors’ tenure had insignificant 
effect on local carbon emissions. As the tenure increased, the influence of the 
municipal party secretaries on carbon emissions was in accordance with the inverted 
U-shaped curve. The inflection point of the curve was approximately 4.3 years. 
  
 
Fig. 5 Carbon emission growth rates on different local officials’ tenures and ages 
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3.2.3 Local officials’ promotion motivation 
Local officials’ age had a positive effect on the total carbon emissions, but only the 
mayors’ age was statistically significant (Table 3). Furthermore, there was a 
non-linear relationship between the age of local officials and the growth rate of carbon 
emissions (Fig. 5). The mayors’ age and carbon emissions showed an inverted 
U-shaped curve, while the municipal party secretaries’ age and carbon emissions 
showed a U-shaped curve. The marginal effect of the mayors on carbon emissions 
shows a change from positive to negative as the age increases. However, the effect of 
age of the municipal party secretaries on carbon emissions was insignificant. 
Local officials had a higher academic level. Around 95.51% of the mayors and 
municipal party secretaries had bachelor degree or above, and 14.00% of local 
officials had doctoral degrees. The overall proportion of mayors with a master or 
doctorate degree was higher than the proportion of the municipal party secretaries. 
The estimated coefficient of Paca_level was positive and significant, while the 
Maca_level was positive but insignificant. 
3.3 Carbon emissions from different sectors 
To further explore the effect of officials’ promotion on carbon emissions, the total 
carbon emissions were decomposed into four sectors including Energy, IPPU, AFOLU 
and Waste and a random effect model was conducted (Table 3). Local officials’ 
promotion sources, professional background, academic level, tenure and age had 
significant effects on carbon emissions from different sectors. The effects of local 
officials’ individual characteristics on total carbon emissions and carbon emissions 
from different sectors were relatively consistent. 
The tests of goodness of fit of the four sectors were different (Table 3). Energy sector 
had the best fit, with R
2
 values of 0.8466 and 0.8612, respectively; and the AFOLU 
sector had the minimum, with R
2
 of 0.5349 and 0.6045. This indicates that the 
promotion of local officials had a larger impact on carbon emissions from Energy sector, 
but limited impact on the carbon emissions from AFOLU sector. However, the results 
of the model estimates in each sector were similar as the total carbon emissions. 
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Table 3 
The influence of local officials’ individual characteristics on carbon emission 
Model 
EC Energy IPPU AFOLU Waste 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
PGDP -7.74e-07*** -2.97e-05*** -1.08e-05*** -1.38e-05*** -2.57e-06*** -7.49e-06** -5.35e-06*** -5.52e-06*** -7.04e-07*** -8.29e-07*** 
POP 0.0234** 0.0281** 0.0198*** 0.0230** 0.00310*** 0.00303*** 0.0004899* 0.000408 0.00112*** 0.00113*** 
INV 0.00536*** 0.00560*** 0.00433*** 0.00448*** 0.000775*** 0.000854*** 0.000185*** 0.000199*** 4.30e-05*** 4.49e-05*** 
IS 0.131** 0.151*** 0.106** 0.126*** 0.0253*** 0.0293*** 0.00948*** 0.00721*** 0.00119*** 0.000407 
Msource 0.222** 
 
0.176* 
 
0.0142* 
 
-0.00073 
 
-0.00161 
 Mpro_economic -0.157 
 
0.0234 
 
0.0696 
 
0.0187 
 
-0.000913 
 Mtenure 0.00413** 
 
-0.00224 
 
0.00984* 
 
0.00359* 
 
0.000347* 
 Mage 0.168*** 
 
0.157*** 
 
0.0193** 
 
0.00497*** 
 
0.000701* 
 Maca_level 0.236 
 
0.187 
 
0.0105 
 
0.00979 
 
0.00443* 
 Psource 
 
0.865** 
 
0.808** 
 
0.118** 
 
-0.0529*** 
 
0.00911*** 
Ppro_economic 
 
-0.00588* 
 
0.0271 
 
-0.0379* 
 
0.0234** 
 
-0.00512* 
Ptenure 
 
-0.313*** 
 
-0.267*** 
 
-0.0530*** 
 
-0.00481* 
 
-0.000304* 
Page 
 
-0.208 
 
-0.160*** 
 
-0.0410*** 
 
-0.00463** 
 
-0.00191*** 
Paca_level 
 
0.688*** 
 
0.507* 
 
0.134*** 
 
0.0241*** 
 
0.0145*** 
Constant 6.342* -13.55*** 4.946** -11.24*** 1.097*** -1.689*** -0.292** -0.138*** -0.315*** -0.358*** 
R2 0.8572 0.8407 0.8466 0.8612 0.8238 0.8034 0.5349 0.6045 0.8095 0.8396 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significances at levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 were conducted using Equation 2. 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 were conducted using Equation 
3. 
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3.4 Robustness test 
Because model outputs depend on model setting and indicator construction, 
robustness tests were performed to verify the stability and reliability of the results. The 
robustness was examined by adjusting model’s core variables and samples. 
(1) Change variables. The square term of tenure (tenure
2
) and age (age
2
) were 
included, and the robustness was evaluated. The results show that the coefficients of the 
variables such as source, pro_economic, tenure, age, and aca_level in Table 4 were 
mostly consistent with those in Table 3, indicating the robustness of the previous 
results. 
(2) Change samples. There are 138 mayors and party committee secretaries in the 
current research, among which 16 people, such as Chen Liangyu, Mao Xiaoping, and Ji 
Jianye, were withdrawn due to job-related crime or malfeasance. Same as the 
adjustment of variables, such mayors and municipal party committee secretaries were 
excluded and a robustness test was conducted. The results were still robust. 
Table 4 
Results of robustness tests 
Model 
EC EC 
(11) (12) (13) (14) 
PGDP -7.74e-06*** -2.97e-05*** -7.74e-07*** -3.59e-05*** 
POP 0.0235*** 0.0282*** 0.0234*** 0.0272*** 
INV 0.00530*** 0.00554*** 0.00536*** 0.00574*** 
IS 0.133** 0.134*** 0.131** 0.152*** 
Msource 0.0324** 
 
0.222 
 Mpro_economic -0.0975 
 
0.157 
 Mtenure 0.00413** 
 
-0.00413 
 Mage 1.604*** 
 
-0.168*** 
 Maca_level 0.263 0.236 
Psource 
 
0.819** 
 
-0.142 
Ppro_economic 
 
-0.0339* 
 
-0.117 
Ptenure 
 
-0.338*** 
 
-0.461*** 
Page -1.172 0.218*** 
Paca_level 
 
0.728*** 
 
0.768** 
Mtenure2 -0.102   
Ptenure2 
 
0.0573*** 
 
 
Mage2 -0.0143***   
Page2  0.0193*   
Constant -37.48* 20.85** 6.342 -13.07*** 
R2 0.6867 0.7079 0.8381 0.8572 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significances at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 11 and 13 were 
conducted using Equation 2. 12 and 14 were conducted using Equation 3. 
4 Discussion 
In this study, a theoretical framework was developed to explore the influence of local 
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officials with different characteristics on carbon emissions under the incentives of 
promotion in 25 cities in the YRD. The results indicate that local officials were not 
conducive to local carbon reductions under promotion incentives. In addition, local 
officials’ promotion experience, pressure and motivation had different effects on 
changes in carbon emissions. 
4.1 The significant effect of local officials’ promotion incentives on carbon 
emissions 
Since the Reform and Opening policy in late 1970s, there is a phenomenon of 
"GDP worship" in Chinese officials (He et al., 2018). Local officials equalled 
reducing carbon emissions to slowing GDP growth at least in their administration 
period, and therefore local officials paid little attention to reduce carbon emissions 
(Smith, 2013). Promotion incentives influence the local officials’ performance on 
carbon reduction, but the influence on mayors and municipal party secretaries are more 
complicated and probably less affected by the economic performance (Zhu, 2011). In 
addition, the marked economic differences between cities reduce the comparability. 
Local officials neither feel pressure to act on carbon emissions from the central 
government nor do they have to deal with international pressures (Ye et al., 2008). 
Under the promotion incentives, local officials tend to develop industries with fast GDP 
growth and often with high energy consumption, such as cement, steel, aluminium, 
chemicals, and energy industries (Cai et al., 2016; Heede, 2014). In the AFOLU sector, 
although local officials had great enthusiasm for building land expansion, the carbon 
emissions from land use change are also influenced by natural factors, such as climate, 
soil and vegetation type (Lai et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2014). Therefore, the model’s 
fitting effect was relatively poor (R
2
 = 0.5349 and 0.6045). China has established 
regulations of waste management, the enforcement of regulation by local officials are 
not very successful (Yang, 2014; Yang et al., 2016). Due to the scarcity of political 
resources and economic resources, local officials often relaxed the standards of 
environmental regulation, increasing carbon emissions in the waste sector, and creasing 
“pollution haven” in some areas (Yang et al., 2018) (Fig. 1). 
4.2 Effects of local officials’ individual characteristics on carbon emissions 
Local official’s individual characteristics can affect the government's development 
policies, which in turn will influence carbon emissions from the area (Dreher et al., 
2009). Moreover, because the present study was conducted in one of China's most 
rapidly growing areas, the YRD, the effects can be much larger. 
First, compared to officials transferred from other cities, locally promoted mayors 
and municipal party secretaries had better performance in terms of carbon reductions. 
Locally promoted officials who are familiar with the area situation will have the 
advantage to keep economic growth with relative less carbon emissions (Chen et al., 
2017). Comparatively, officials who were transferred from other cities have relative 
less knowledge of local environment. They usually choose a new policy to replace the 
old policy to show their performance (Yang et al., 2016). In addition, they have to 
take a longer time to get the balance of economic development and environmental 
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protection, with the possibility of increasing carbon emissions. 
Second, local officials’ tenure had a more complex impact on carbon emission. The 
carbon emissions during municipal party secretaries’ tenure increased first and then 
decreased, an inverted U-shaped curve. A limited tenure for local officials will very 
possibly push them to take short-term policies and ignore the potential negative 
environmental impacts (Besley and Case, 1995). To show their “performance” and 
“ability”, new officials have to quickly carry out a variety of projects to stimulate 
economic development, with the result of often unavoidably high carbon emissions. 
With the extension of tenure, officials obtain more clear information about their 
promotion, and the incentives effect on officials may decline gradually. At the same 
time, the officials’ enthusiasm of developing economy reduced slowly. When the 
promotion of local officials become gradually stable (Julio and Yook, 2012), 
supervision also increases. With less sacrificing environment in exchange for 
economic development, the increase in carbon emissions will reverse. However, 
before leaving, officials may take into account the lagging effect of a low-carbon 
development. And their attitude towards carbon reduction can once again become 
negative, with a result of rebounded carbon emissions. 
Third, the age of 60 has been set up as the retire age for city mayors in China. 
Therefore, the younger local officials, the higher expectations of promotion (Bu et al., 
2016). To catch more promotion opportunities, young officials may prefer economic 
development to environmental protection, with the consequence of increasing carbon 
emissions (He et al., 2018; Pu and Fu, 2018). Our results indicate that after this 
turning point of 46.57 years old, the promotion incentives reduced markedly. 
Finally, local officials’ education is mainly reflected in the academic level and 
professional background. First, there is no significant relationship between local 
officials’ academic levels and carbon emissions. This is in stark contrast to the results 
of South India where officials with higher education level can improve the allocation 
of regional resources, with a lower carbon emissions (Besley et al., 2012). Academic 
requirement is important for cadre selection and appointment in China, so local 
officials are keen to obtain high academic levels. Most local officials in the YRD have 
a Master's degree. Considering already heavy workload, there is wide concern how 
the local officials have sufficient time to complete the required courses for their 
part-time academic education. In China, higher education levels do not always equal 
to stronger awareness and more knowledge of environmental protection. Second, local 
officials who have a professional background in economic or management, are 
conducive to carbon reduction. From the turnover of Chinese leaders, it can be seen 
that Chinese officials’ professional backgrounds gradually change from expert 
technical type to public management type (Yang et al., 2013). Previous officials are 
representatives of technical experts, and they pay more attention to the construction of 
big infrastructure projects, for example highway and coal-power plant. Although this 
helped the Chinese economy to take off, it came with a rapid increase in carbon 
emissions. Officials with professional background in economics or management are 
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familiar with the laws of the macroeconomic operation, and can pay more attention to 
the long-term sustainable development in the area (Qi et al., 2008; Zheng et al., 2014). 
4.3 Policy implications of local officials’ governance and carbon reduction 
To reduce carbon emissions, more attention should be paid to the fundamental 
factors causing the increase in carbon emissions. Local officials’ promotion incentives 
should be improved at the institutional level. Our results provide suggestions for 
official selection and promotion in practice. First, more officials should be appointed 
from local cities. Second, the tenure of local officials can be, to some extent, extended. 
Third, less attention should be paid to the academic level above bachelor degree, but 
more attention should be given to the academic background. 
“GDP worship” cannot sustain economic development and environmental protection, 
for example carbon reduction. In the evaluation of local officials, the proportion of 
GDP should be further reduced, but the proportion of environmental protection, 
particularly carbon reduction, should be increased. A multi-objective evaluation system 
including economic development and environmental protection should be adopted. In 
addition, low-carbon development should be prioritized. 
4.4 Limitation and future research 
Same as many studies, there are some limitations in the current study. EDGAR 
provided the carbon emissions grid data up to 2010, so it is unavailable for the 
analyses after 2011. In particular, the Chinese government has paid more attention to 
environmental protection after 2012 (Yang et al., 2015), and the effect of local 
officials’ performance on carbon emissions may change. In addition, only the 
promotion source, education, tenure and age were selected to reflect the heterogeneity 
of local officials, and these characteristics may be imperfect to reflect the differences 
between all local officials. Local officials’ gender, as well as the careers of military, 
state-owned enterprises, universities, and others can also affect their promotion 
(Dreher et al., 2009; Ericson, 2009). More research on these areas will improve our 
understanding of local official promote and carbon emissions in China. 
5 Conclusions 
From the three aspects of promotion experience, pressure during current tenure and 
motivation for future promotion, a theoretical framework was constructed to explore 
the influence of local officials’ promotion incentives on China’s carbon emissions in 
25 cities in the Yangtze River Delta. The results indicated that: 
(1) Locally promoted mayors and municipal party secretaries had better 
performance of reducing carbon emissions, compared to officials transferred from 
other cities. 
(2) With the increase in tenure, the effect of local officials on carbon emissions had 
an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
(3) Younger local officials were more likely to lead to increase in carbon emissions. 
(4) The increase in the local officials’ academic levels did not promote a reduction 
in carbon emissions. However, local officials with economic or managerial 
professional backgrounds were more conducive to carbon reduction. 
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Therefore, encouraging promotion from their home cities, extending the tenure of 
local officials, and paying more attention to academic background rather than 
academic level can be helpful for China’s carbon reduction. 
Acknowledgement 
This work was supported by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects 
of China (No. 1214073 and No. 2012065), the National Natural Science Foundation 
of China (No. 41571162, No. 41601592 and 41671171). 
References 
Ales, L., Maziero, P., Yared, P., 2014. A theory of political and economic cycles. Journal of Economic 
Theory 153, 224-251. 
Anagnostou, E., John, E.H., Edgar, K.M., Foster, G.L., Ridgwell, A., Inglis, G.N., Pancost, R.D., Lunt, 
D.J., Pearson, P.N., 2016. Changing atmospheric CO2 concentration was the primary driver of early 
Cenozoic climate. Nature 533(7603), 380-384. 
Ang, B., Su, B., 2016. Carbon emission intensity in electricity production: A global analysis. Energy 
Policy 94, 56-63. 
Besley, T., Case, A., 1995. Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices? Evidence 
from gubernatorial term limits. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(3), 769-798. 
Besley, T., Pande, R., Rao, V., 2012. Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in 
South India. World Bank Economic Review 26(2), 191-216. 
Bu, D., Zhang, C., Lin, T., 2016. Will political promotion expectation decrease the pay gap in 
state-owned enterprises in China? China Journal of Accounting Studies 4(1), 53-78. 
Burns, J.P., Wang, X., 2010. Civil service reform in China: Impacts on civil servants' behaviour. The 
China Quarterly 201, 58-78. 
Cai, B., Wang, J., He, J., Geng, Y., 2016. Evaluating CO2 emission performance in China’s cement 
industry: an enterprise perspective. Applied energy 166, 191-200. 
Chen, Z., Tang, J., Wan, J., Chen, Y., 2017. Promotion incentives for local officials and the expansion 
of urban construction land in China: Using the Yangtze River Delta as a case study. Land Use Policy 63, 
214-225. 
Dreher, A., Lamla, M.J., Lein, S.M., Somogyi, F., 2009. The impact of political leaders' profession and 
education on reforms. Journal of Comparative Economics 37(1), 169-193. 
Duan, H., Hu, Q., 2014. Local officials' concerns of climate change issues in China: a case from 
Jiangsu. Journal of cleaner production 64, 545-551. 
Ericson, R.E., 2009. Eurasian natural gas pipelines: the political economy of network interdependence. 
Eurasian Geography and Economics 50(1), 28-57. 
Friedlingstein, P., Andrew, R.M., Rogelj, J., Peters, G.P., Canadell, J.G., Knutti, R., Luderer, G., 
Raupach, M.R., Schaeffer, M., van Vuuren, D.P., Le Quere, C., 2014. Persistent growth of CO2 
emissions and implications for reaching climate targets. Nature Geoscience 7(10), 709-715. 
Geist, H.J., Lambin, E.F., 2002. Proximate causes and underlying driving forces of tropical 
deforestation: Tropical forests are disappearing as the result of many pressures, both local and regional, 
acting in various combinations in different geographical locations. BioScience 52(2), 143-150. 
Gibney, E., 2016. 2017 sneak peek: What the new year holds for science. Nature 541(7635), 14. 
He, C., Mao, X., Zhu, X., 2018. Industrial dynamics and environmental performance in urban China. 
20 
Journal of Cleaner Production 195, 1512-1522. 
Heede, R., 2014. Tracing anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to fossil fuel and 
cement producers, 1854–2010. Climatic Change 122(1), 229-241. 
Jalil, A., Mahmud, S.F., 2009. Environment Kuznets curve for CO2 emissions: a cointegration analysis 
for China. Energy Policy 37(12), 5167-5172. 
Janssens-Maenhout, G., Crippa, M., Guizzardi, D., Muntean, M., Schaaf, E., Dentener, F., Bergamaschi, 
P., Pagliari, V., Olivier, J., Peters, J., 2017. EDGAR v4. 3.2 Global Atlas of the three major Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions for the period 1970–2012. Earth Syst. Sci. Data Discuss. 
Jin, H.H., Qian, Y.Y., Weingast, B.R., 2005. Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, 
Chinese style. Journal of Public Economics 89(9-10), 1719-1742. 
Julio, B., Yook, Y., 2012. Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles. Journal of Finance 
67(1), 45-83. 
Krebs, P., Koutsias, N., Conedera, M., 2012. Modelling the eco-cultural niche of giant chestnut trees: 
new insights into land use history in southern Switzerland through distribution analysis of a living 
heritage. Journal of Historical Geography 38(4), 372-386. 
Lai, L., Huang, X., Yang, H., Chuai, X., Zhang, M., Zhong, T., Chen, Z., Chen, Y., Wang, X., 
Thompson, J.R., 2016. Carbon emissions from land-use change and management in China between 
1990 and 2010. Science advances 2(11), 8. 
Li, J., Huang, X., Kwan, M., Yang, H., Chuai, X., 2018. The effect of urbanization on carbon dioxide 
emissions efficiency in the Yangtze River Delta, China. Journal of Cleaner Production 188, 38-48. 
Li, J., Huang, X., Yang, H., Chuai, X., Wu, C., 2017. Convergence of carbon intensity in the Yangtze 
River Delta, China. Habitat International 60, 58-68. 
Liu, J.G., Diamond, J., 2005. China's environment in a globalizing world. Nature 435(7046), 
1179-1186. 
Liu, Y., Huang, X., Yang, H., Zhong, T., 2014. Environmental effects of land-use/cover change caused 
by urbanization and policies in Southwest China Karst area–A case study of Guiyang. Habitat 
International 44, 339-348. 
MacDougall, A.H., Friedlingstein, P., 2015. The origin and limits of the near proportionality between 
climate warming and cumulative CO2 emissions. Journal of Climate 28(10), 4217-4230. 
National Bureau Statistics of China, 2016. China statistical Yearbook 2014. China Statistics Press, 
Beijing. 
Pachauri, R.K., Allen, M.R., Barros, V.R., Broome, J., Cramer, W., Christ, R., Church, J.A., Clarke, L., 
Dahe, Q., Dasgupta, P., 2014. Climate change 2014: synthesis report. Contribution of Working Groups 
I, II and III to the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. IPCC. 
Peters, G.P., Le Quéré, C., Andrew, R.M., Canadell, J.G., Friedlingstein, P., Ilyina, T., Jackson, R.B., 
Joos, F., Korsbakken, J.I., McKinley, G.A., Sitch, S., Tans, P., 2017. Towards real-time verification of 
CO2 emissions. Nature Climate Change 7(12), 848-850. 
Pu, Z., Fu, J., 2018. Economic growth, environmental sustainability and China mayors' promotion. 
Journal of Cleaner Production 172, 454-465. 
Qi, Y., Ma, L., Zhang, H., Li, H., 2008. Translating a global issue into local priority: China's local 
government response to climate change. The Journal of Environment & Development 17(4), 379-400. 
Smith, G., 2013. Measurement, promotions and patterns of behavior in Chinese local government. 
21 
Journal of Peasant Studies 40(6), 1027-1050. 
Stern, D.I., Common, M.S., 2001. Is there an environmental Kuznets curve for sulfur? Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 41(2), 162-178. 
Sun, C.W., Zhang, F., Xu, M.L., 2017. Investigation of pollution haven hypothesis for China: An 
ARDL approach with breakpoint unit root tests. Journal of Cleaner Production 161, 153-164. 
Xu, G.L., Huang, X.J., Zhong, T.Y., Chen, Y., Wu, C.Y., Jin, Y.Z., 2015. Assessment on the effect of 
city arable land protection under the implementation of China's National General Land Use Plan 
(2006-2020). Habitat International 49, 466-473. 
Yang, H., 2014. China must continue the momentum of green law. Nature 509(7502), 535. 
Yang, H., Flower, R.J., Thompson, J.R., 2013. China's new leaders offer great hope. Nature 493, 
163-163. 
Yang, H., Huang, X., Thompson, J.R., Bright, R.M., Astrup, R., 2016. The crushing weight of urban 
waste. Science 351(6274), 674-674. 
Yang, H., Huang, X., Thompson, J.R., Flower, R.J., 2015. Enforcement key to China's environment. 
Science 347(6224), 834-835. 
Yang, H., Ma, M.G., Thompson, J.R., Flower, R.J., 2018. Waste management, informal recycling, 
environmental pollution and public health. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 72(3), 
237-243. 
Yang, Q., Geng, Y., Dong, H.J., Zhang, J.Q., Yu, X.M., Sun, L., Lu, X.R., Chen, Y.H., 2017. Effect of 
environmental regulations on China's graphite export. Journal of Cleaner Production 161, 327-334. 
Ye, B., Jiang, J., Li, C., Miao, L., Tang, J., 2017. Quantification and driving force analysis of 
provincial-level carbon emissions in China. Applied Energy 198, 223-238. 
Ye, Q., Li, M., Huanbo, Z., Huimin, L., 2008. Translating a global issue into local priority: China's 
local government response to climate change. Journal of Environment & Development A Review of 
International Policy 17(4), 379-400. 
Zhang, X.H., Wu, L.Q., Zhang, R., Deng, S.H., Zhang, Y.Z., Wu, J., Li, Y.W., Lin, L.L., Li, L., Wang, 
Y.J., Wang, L.L., 2013. Evaluating the relationships among economic growth, energy consumption, air 
emissions and air environmental protection investment in China. Renewable & Sustainable Energy 
Reviews 18, 259-270. 
Zheng, S., Kahn, M.E., Sun, W., Luo, D., 2014. Incentives for China's urban mayors to mitigate 
pollution externalities: The role of the central government and public environmentalism. Regional 
Science and Urban Economics 47, 61-71. 
Zhu, Y., 2011. "Performance legitimacy” and China’s political adaptation strategy. Journal of Chinese 
Political Science 16(2), 123-140. 
 
